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Abstract 
Recent research attempting to understand the behaviour of unemployment, and more generally the 
labour market itself, has emphasised the need to further our understanding of labour market 
dynamics. Underlying this approach is the assumption that labour markets are characterised by a 
constant turnover of both workers and jobs, with a matching mechanism playing a fundamental role 
in describing the way in which these two flows meet. A key feature of these theories is that the 
matching mechanism, which is assumed to characterise the search process of individuals attempting 
to find a job and firms looking to fill a vacancy, can be analysed from an aggregate perspective and 
approximated by a simple matching function. On the basis on somewhat limited empirical work, it 
has however, tended to appear in the literature as a reduced form description of the search process, 
which is best approximated a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function, relating the flow of 
new hires to the stock of unemployment and vacancies. In light of the ambiguity which arises from 
existing empirical work as to the char�cteristics of this function., this paper provides a comparative 
analysis of the matching process in France, Great Britain and Spain, adopting what we feel to be a 
more systematic approach to the econometric modelling of this function and using a more reliable 
data set. In contrast to existing work in this area, whilst our results support the existence of an 
aggregate matching function in all three labour markets, we do not find overwhelming evidence for 
what has become the somewhat standard assumption in theoretical research of a constant returns to 
scale in the matching technology. Instead the function would appear to exhibit increasing returns in 
both Great Britain and Spain and decreasing in France. Perhaps more importantly however, given the 
ramifications for both empirical and theoretical research in this area. a number of our results would 
tend to draw into question the appropriateness of the standard specification within a European 
context. 

IlDtroduction: 
Recent research (see Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990, 1994) and Pissarid .. (1986» has 
tended to turn away from the conventional approach to unemployment emphasising instead the necessity of 
understanding the dynamics of the labour market. Underlying this approach is the assumption that labour 
markets are characterised by a constant turnover of both workers and jobs, with a matching mechanism 
playing a fundamental role in describing the way in which these two flows meet. A key feature of these 
theories is that the matching mechanism, which is assumed to characterise the search process of individuals 
attempting to find a job and firms looking to fill a vacancy, can be analysed from an aggregate perspective 
and approximated by a simple matching function. Thus the function appears as a reduced form description 
of the search process, taking on a role similar to that of the aggregate production function in production 
theory. 
On the basis of somewhat limited empirical work the matching function has tended to be best 
approximated in theoretical work by a constant returns to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas function, which 
relates the flow of new hires to the stock of unemployment and vacancies. Embodying such a matching 
function in a structuraJ model of the labour market, it can be shown that the assumption of constant returns 
to scale ensures the uniqueness (aJthough not existence) of the equilibrium. Somewhat more interesting 
implications arise however, if the matching function is found to exhibit increasing returns. For, under certain 
conditions increasing returns in the matching technology can give rise to multiple equilibria (see Diamond 
1982), which could then offer one explanation for why economies appear «stuck" at high levels of both 
unemployment and vacancies. 
Yet, despite a growing literature in this area, existing empirical work does not provide 
overwhelming support for either the existence of such functions or much consensus as to their long run 
characteristics. The data appearing to support the existence of a conventionaJ matching function exhibiting 
constant returns to scale in both the United States (Blanchard and Diamond (1989 and (1990) and the 
Netherlands (van Ours (1992) and decreasing returns in Australia (Smith (1992». Empirical work in Britain 
(pissarides (1986) and Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991) has however, had somewhat varied success. 
Attempts to reconcile these inconsistencies are hampered by the fact that: a) there appears to be no 
standardisation of either the data used for estimation or the econometric methodology adopted; and b) 
research has been carried out on a number of different specifications of the matching function. 
In this study therefore we provide a comparative analysis of the matching process in France, 
Great Britain and Spain, adopting what we feel to be a more systematic approach to the econometric 
modelling of this function and using a more reliable data set. The objective being, given the centraJ role that 
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the aggregate matching function plays in the flows approach to unemployment, to determine: a) whether the 
concept of an aggregate matching function receives support from European data; and b) the extent to which 
the standard specification, originally developed for the US market, is appropriate within a European 
context. In the final section of the paper, we go on to utilise this framework to assess the impact of changes 
in a number of institutional characteristics of these labour markets on the efficiency of the aggregate 
matching process. 
An interesting feature of this analysis is that the choice of countries enables us to analyse the 
detenninants of the matching process in labour markets with very different cultural and institutional 
characteristics, differences which one would expect to have a fundamental impact on the long run 
characteristics of the matching function. From an institutional point of view, perhaps the most differentiating 
feature is the nature of labour market regulation in these economies. Of the European markets the British 
market is the one that most resembles the flexible model of the US. The Spanish market on the other hand 
is, despite recent changes to increase flexibility, much more akin to one's perception of the European model, 
with a larger public sector and a highly regulated labour market. France is generally considered to lie 
somewhere between these two extremes, although it is located more towards the Spanish end of the 
spectrum than the British. 
2 The Aggregate Matching Function: 
A natural starting point for our analysis is the standard aggregate matching function a la 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989), which has proved to be so influentiaJ for empirical work in this area. In 
contrast to other work, no prior assumptions will be made with respect to the functional form of this 
relationship, except that it is best approximated by the following Cobb-Douglas relationship which relates 
the flow of new hires to the stock of unemployment and vacancies: 
I) 
where &, the �or term enters the function multiplicatively and is assumed to be: Ef::::: IN(O, if), H 
represents the number of new hires, U, the level of unemployment and V, the level of vacancies. The 
marginal propensities hu and If" are assumed to be positive and decreasing i.e. hu 2:: 0 and hy 2:: 0,  
huu 2:: 0 and hvv < O. As in  aggregate production theory, C is  a scalar parameter introduced in order to  
. 
capture the total factor productivity of the function. 
It is important to note however, that changes in the efficiency of the matching function pose 
considerable problems for time series estimation. For, although it may be appropriate in cross sectional 
analysis to assume that at a specific point in time the efficiency of the matching technology is given, and that 
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the appropriate function for estimation is that given by equation one, such a specification is clearly 
inappropriate for times series analysis, since changes in the quantitative efficiency with which a match 
occurs are not likely to remain constant over time. On the contrary, shifts in the matching function will 
occur as factors which affect the overall level of efficiency of the function are themselves subject to change. 
In practice the efficiency of the matching technology will be dependent on factors. such as: the accumulation 
of experience about search methods., increased effectiveness of job searchers; the introduction of new search 
methods, labour market institutions and policies; and the existence of both search imperfections and 
mismatch between the unemployed and vacancies. The effectiveness of the unemployed will itself be 
affected by: a) increases in the choosiness of employers (caused for example, by: rigid employment 
protection laws; greater uncertainty with respect to prevailing economic conditions; and an increase in the 
numbers of long teon unemployed); and b) changes in the overall degree of motivation of job searchers (as a 
result of changes in the level of replacement ratios, benefit durations and eligibility conditions and the 
prevailing general economic conditions)l . 
To allow for such time variant changes in efficiency, we include a number of explanatory 
variables in our regressions which might reasonably be expected to have affected the efficiency of the 
matching process over our sample periods. Doing so the specification for estinution becomes: 
H = Cr, . U" . V' . }.1}./rl . SJr •• 2) 
where: AfM represents an index of mismatch; SJ captures changes in the effectiveness of the unemployed; 
Hu >0; HI' >0; H"IM <0; and HS] >0. In other words, new hires are assumed to be an increasing 
function of both unemployment, vacancies and the effectiveness of the unemployed. but a decreasing 
function of mismatch. Clearly if r 1 = r 1 = 0, then the variables included to allow for time variant changes in 
efficiency would appear to be irrelevant to the matching relationship and the function reduces to the 
standard specification a la Blanchard and Diamond. Taking logarithms of equation two the long run 
relationship of interest becomes: 
3) 
The absolute growth of efficiency over our sample period is therefore given by c + r I + r 2 + r). Including 
proxies for mismatch and search intensity enables us however, to detract from the total change in efficiency 
that which can be attributed directly to these factors. From this perspective then, this type of analysis could 
I We usc the term intensity interchangeably to represent factors which affect the unemployed's degree of effectiveness as job­
scckcrs and the fact that firms and the unemployed may not all ncc:cssarily search with the same degree of intensity to form a 
successful match. 
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help with the identification of those areas which should be targeted by labour market policy in order to 
increase the overall level of efficiency of matching. 
2.1 The Data: 
A brief review of the existing literature highlights the fact that this type of empirical research is 
plagued with problems of data reliability. Concern has tended to focus, because of problems of poor 
coverage, on the reliability of results based on official vacancy data, yet the most fundamental problem for 
existing empiri� work is the lack of data on the number of new hires. As a consequence researchers have 
in effect tended to estimate aggregate unemployment outflow functions, using aggregate outflows from 
unemployment as the dependent variable and not aggregate matching functions2• An important point of 
departure of this work is that in contrast to other studies, the empirical specification estimated in this paper 
would appear to be more representative of the theoretical concept of an aggregate matching function in that 
total hires and not outflows tr.0m unemployment (as in the work ofPissarides (1986), Burda and Wyplosz 
(1994), Burda (1994), Lehman (1994) and Smith (1993)) are used as the dependent variable. 
In the British analysis we use a previously under-utilised series of the total number of new hires 
in Great Britain constructed from individual tax records. It is possible to construct a new hires series in this 
manner for the UK simply because each time an individua1 1eaves ajob the Inland Revenue (the tax authority 
in the UK) provides, via the employer, the individual with a tax certificate (P4S) which lists a number of the 
individual's tax details. By law, the individual is then obliged to pass this certificate on to his new employer, 
who in turn returns it back to the tax office, thus providing the tax authorities with an updated record of the 
individual's employment history. New entrants do not slip through this recording net, since a firm has to fill 
a different tax return (P46) for all new employees, who do not present them with a P4S certificate when 
they commence employment. Theoretically speaking then, the Inland Revenue has a record of all job to job 
transitions within the economy, together with all transitions from out of the labour force to employment. 
For the French analysis we construct a new hires series using official data on unemployment 
outflows disaggregated according to sex and reason, published by the Ministere du Travail. More 
specifically, we take the number of outflows from unemployment to employment as a proxy for the number 
of new hires in the economy. We argue that this measure is more consistent with the theoretical concept of a 
matching function than the unemployment outflows measure previously used by Burda and Wyplosz, since a 
large proportion of total outflows from French unemployment is to either training schemes or non-
1 Exceptions to thls being the disaggregate work of Burgess and Anderson (1995) and the original study by Blanchard and 
Diamond (1990). As argued in Bell (1995) ho'A-'CVCI'. the construction of the new hires series in the latter study throws some 
doubt on its reliability. 
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employment labour market states. Moreover, the statistics indicate that approximately 70"10 of individuals 
entering training schemes return to unemployment on completion of their course. 
Two possible sources exist for the construction of a Spanish new hires series: the total number 
of "controloS' or "coJocaciones" registered each month at INFM (Institu/o NacionaJ de EmpJeo • the 
Spanish national employment agency). The distinguishing feature between these two definitions being that in 
order for a contralo to be considered a colocacion: a) the firm has to have first registered the vacancy with 
INEM prior to the contract begin signed; and b) the worker filling the vacancy has also to have been 
previously register� as being unemployed with INEM. Contra/os on the other hand, cover any new hire 
registered with INEM regardless of whether the associated vacancy or person signing the contract had 
previously been registered with them. Although the number of contra/os each month can be argued to 
provide a more complete definition of the number of new hires in the economy in this work we use the total 
number of colocaciones at INEM, given that data on total contratos is only available from 1984 onwards3 . 
Our measure of unemployment for France. Great Britain and Spain is taken from the official 
series of the stock of registered unemployment published in the monthly labour statistics bulletins of the 
government agency responsible for employment. respectively, the Ministere du Travail, the Department of 
Employment and lHEM. For, the French and British vacancy series we take the official data on the number 
of unfilled vacancies at the end of the month as a proxy for the total number of vacancies on offer in the 
economy, assuming that official vacancies are proportional to the total number of vacancies in the economy 
as a whole, and that this proportion has remained relatively stable over the sample period". Our Spanish 
measurement of vacancies is constructed using the methodology of Antolin (1993, p.(j...7). This procedure 
essentially provides a correction to the official vacancy series again to allow for those vacancies which not 
filled through the National Employment Office' 
To assess the impact of changes in the effectiveness of the unemployed on the numbers of new 
hires for a given level of unemployment and vacancies, we investigate the relevance of a number of 
variables, such as: the generosity of the benefit system (in terms of average amount paid and the extent of 
3 Note, that although technically speaking the Spanish employment services records provide a complete record of the number 
ofoew hiles in the economy, since firms an:: lega1ly obliged to register an employment contract with INFM, we do encounter a 
poeentiaI timing problem with the Spanish series. For, prior to the 1994 legislation firms were only obliged to notify the 
contract to INEM at some point during the contract life, thus DOtification did not necessarily have to take place at the time the 
actual hiring occurred . 
.. As we are using official vacancies as a pro1C)' for the total number of vacancies in the economy one should, given. the policies 
adopted. by the British Qoo..-emment during the period 1968-1974 to increase the effectiveness of the public employment 
services, allow for changes in the ratio of employment centre vacancies to total vacancies over the estimation period. The 
official vacancies series for Great Britain is therefore adjusted according to the method outlined in Jackman et al. (1989). To 
swnmarise, this procedure im."Olves correcting the official vacancy series according to its share of economy wide vacancies. 
oS Following the work of Gomez and Dolado (1995) a correction factor of 0.25 is applied to the official vacancy series. 
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benefit coverage); family status; replacement ratios; and the proportion of disenfranchised groups (i.e. the 
long term unemployed, women and youths), factors argued in the literature to be important determinants on 
the search intensity of the unemployed. In light of the predominance of the mismatch argument in both the 
economic and political debate, we also assess the impact of changes in the degree of regional, skill, and 
industrial mismatch6 . 
Assessing the impact of changes in the degree of search intensity of finns on the matching 
function is somewhat more problematic. For, whilst it seems reasonable to assume, given issues of 
credibility and the economic conditions of the past 20 years, that a finn will only advertise a vacancy when: 
a) there is a position to be filled; and b) they are actively involved in filling it, firms undoubtedly differ in the 
search intensity of their recruitment drive. It is difficult however, to allow for these effects on the demand 
side of the market in empirical work, since factors which affect search intensity also affect a fum's decision 
to open a vacancy. Despite this drawback, one important factor investigated is the affect on the matching 
function of the changes in employment protection legislation which have taken place since the early 1970's. 
The idea being that one would have expected the increasing trend for tighter regulation during the 1970's 
and the partial relaxation of the 1980's to have had a significant impact. at a given level of unemployment 
and vacancies, on both a finn's desire to hire and their level of choosiness with respect to potential 
employees, and thus ultimately on the degree of effectiveness of the unemployed. 
The French approach to labour market deregulation has unfortunately been somewhat erratic, 
with the deregulation policies which were enacted in order to introduce greater labour market flexibility 
often being followed by the imposition of tighter controls. This is especially true of regulations regarding the 
use of temporary and short term contracts. making it is. somewhat difficult to pick up these effects in 
econometric estimations. The main developments in French labour market regulation which might have been 
expected to have had an impact on the characteristics of the aggregate matching function over our sample 
period are: the introduction of fixed tenn contracts in 1979, allowing finns to hire staff on fixed term 
contracts, which were not subject to the usual stringent regulations regarding employment conditions and 
dismissals; the .1982 government regulations restricting the use of temporary workers, which were 
subsequently extended by the Socialist Government in 1985 with the introduction of new legislation 
extending the maximum duration of these contracts and expanding the number of justifiable reasons for not 
6 In order to obtain an accurate measure of industria1 mismatch data on the unemployed classified according to their last job 
are required. Unfortunately time series data at the required frequency level do not exist in Great Britain for the whole of our 
sample period. For the British estimations we adopt therefore the approach taken by Nickell and Layard (1986) and Pissarides 
(1986). this being to use an indicator of industrial turbulence (the absolute change in industrial and production industries 
employment as a percentage of total civilian employment) as a proxy for the degree of industrial mismatch. 
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converting them into pennanent employment; the 1986 legislation, which abolished the necessity for firms -to 
obtain Government consent before the dismissals of workers, but imposed on finns with more than 50 
employees the legal obligation to formulate a social plan when dismissing more than 10 workers; and finally, 
the shift in regulatory preferences with the change in Government in 1989 towards tighter regulation in the 
sense that:· a) a limited number of reasons was again introduced governing the use of the temporary 
contracts; and b) the role of the public authorities was extended, with the need for prior approval for a 
social plan in the event of collective redundancies and a prolonging of the administrative procedures prior to 
redundancy. It is important to note however, that as our measure of French new hires only relates to 
engagements to pennanent fUll time positions, the impact of legislation concerning the use of temporary and 
short-term contracts can only be expected to have an indirect impact on the French matching process. 
Indirect, in the sense that the loosening of restrictions on the use of these types of contracts might be 
expected to ease the overall hiring process for both temporary and permanent jobs. 
In the British ana1ysis we examine the effects of the following changes to employment 
protection legislation: the 1971 Unfair Dismissals Act under which workers were given the right to unfair 
dismissal; the Employment Protection Act 1975, which extended periods of notice given before a job 
termination; and the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts. which led to a relaxation of regulation in an attempt 
to increase labour market flexibility. Under the 1982 act for example. the right to unfair dismissals no longer 
applied to those with less than two years experience. A priori one would expect the 1971 and 1975 
legislation to have a negative effect on the hiring process, in that they imposed more stringent firing 
regulations and the 1982 act to have a positive effect, since it loosened the regulations regarding the 
dismissal of workers. 
The most significant change in Spanish employment protection legislation, in terms of its likely 
impact on the characteristics of the Spanish matching function, would appear to have been the reform (Ley 
32/84 Acuerdo Ecol1omico y Social) of the Workers Statute (Ley del £Statuto de Los Trabajadores 1980), 
which was brought into force at the beginning of 1985. To summarise, these reforms introduced new 
regulations to widen the scope for the use of fixed-term and temporary contracts, which although allowed 
for under the }980 act had not previously been used extensively. From 1985 onwards firms were able to 
employ workers under temporary, fixed term, training/apprenticeship and part-time contracts. The main 
advantage of the fonner two types of contracts being that firing costs, in terms of both severance payments 
and workers rights against dismissal workers are significantly lower than for those individuals employed 
under permanent contracts. since temporary contracts do not incur obligatory severance pay upon 
termination and workers under fixed-term contracts do not have the right to sue their employer for unfair 
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dismissal. Finally, we indude a dummy variable to a110w for the change to the system of registration 
introduced in January 1994 of a11 new contracts at INEM. In addition to the inclusion of the appropriate 
dummy variables, we also attempt in the Spanish analysis, to incorporate the changes in the nature of the 
employment protection system by allowing for the number of cases brought before both Conciliation bodies 
and the Courts, together with the proportion of these which were awarded in favour of the employer. 
1.1 Metbodology and Res.lls: 
Preliminary DF tests and ADF tests suggested thet the logarithms of all of the series used in the 
estimation procedure were integrated to order one. An analysis of the residuals did however, indicate the 
presellGe of outliers and structural breaks, which could have biased the results towards one forcing US to 
accept the hypothesis of integration. The unit root tests were re-estimated using the Perron (1989) 
procedure for testing in the presence of structural breaks and outliers. Unfortunately these latter test resu1ts 
proved inconclusive, being largely dependent on model selection. In light of this inability to reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity 'in the data we proceed to estimate using OLS the following general dynamic 
error correction regression specification with differences and lagged levels of the dependent and explanatory 
variables (see Hendry (1987), implementing prior to estimation the Johansen's (1989 and 1990) Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood procedure to ensure for the presence of a cointegrating vector': 
.t t t t 
611, = ao+rTime+.1.Lalu,-I+.1.La2Vl.f+.1.Lallnmt.f + +.1.L a.sit. I + plh,.l +P1Ut. 
1 .. 1 1.\ i.\ 1.\ 4) 
where: lower case letters represent natural logarithms; .1. first order differences; u, the unemployment stock; 
v, the registered vacancy stock; mm denotes an index of the degree of mismatch; n. changes in search 
intensity and SI' S2' Sl are dummy variables included to capture seasonal effects. Due to data constraints we 
were unable to carry out the analysis for each country over the same time period. The French estimations 
are therefore carried out over the period 1979.1 to 1994.1V, the British, over the period 1967.1 to 1985.lV 
and the Spanish over the period 1980.1 to 1995.IV. 
In table one we report both the results of the estimation of the standard specification a la 
Blanchard and Diamond (abbreviated in the table to Stan) and those of the specification which explicitly 
allows for factors affecting the efficiency of the matching function. Focusing initially on the estimation of 
the standard specification, it is evident that the results obtained are somewhat mixed. In contrast to a priori 
7 These results do however, suggest the presence: of more than one cointegratiilg vectors in all of the regressions. In such 
cases. the Hendry technique descnbed abqve is. argued to be preferatik, since the Johansen approach does not provide us with 
any indication as to which of these two vectors should be used in our analysis of the long run 
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expectations we find that: a) vacancies enter the French specification in a negative, but insignificant manner, 
and b) increases in unemployment in Spain are found to have a significant negative impact on the matching 
process. Only the British results would appear to be consistent with the underlying theory, in that 
unemployment and vacancies enter in a positive manner. These results would not then appear to be 
consistent with the implicit assumptions of the standard specification, nor do they offer overwbelming 
support for the assumption commonly found in both the empirical and theoretical literature of a matching 
teclmology which exhibits constant returns to scale. 
Table One: 
Long Run Parameters of the Aggregate Matching Function in France, Great Britain and Spain: 
(t·statistics in parenthesis) 
VIr;lb� France Stan p""", OS Stan OB Spain Stan Spom 
.... - .(US (-2.89) -0.02 (-3.t7) 0.02 (3.18) 
""""",0, .. "" 0.74 (L86) 0.58 (2.26) 0.64 (2.8) 0.18 (2.08) -0.53 (-1.47) 0.88 (1.70) 
"""""" .0.04 (-0.55) 0.09 (1.74) 0.70 (2.5) 0.40 (2.87) 0.13 (0.97) 0.35 (U3) 
benefit effect -0.24 (-2.21) -0.53 (-1.22) -1.04 (-1.85) 
prop U who are youths -0.51 (-2.38) �.93 (-2.95) 
regional mismatdl -0.06 (-3.54) -0.12 (-2.39) -0.68 (-1.06) 
- """&< 1.93 (1.62) 
proportion U female I.SO (2.80) 
jWOJlOrtioD U very long term -0.12 (-1.37) 
Lq:lllltioIII 
France 1986 0.11 (3.09) 
France 1989 -0.16 (-2.85) 
Spain 1984 0.41 (1.74) 
SpaiD 1994 • .<1. (1.86) 
OreatBritain 1975 -0.36 H.l4) 
Great Britain 1980 .0.2' (-4.07) 
_da 
R "'" 0.73 •. 82 0." 0.85 0.43 0.51 
LM Correlation F(4,42�.18 F(4,34)<>O.32 F(4.50pl.l0 F(4,47)mO.19 F(4,4S)ooO.61 F(4,44)-I.25 
Ramsey Reset Test F(I,45)=O.54 F(I.4I)=O.30 F(J,S3)-.072 f(I,SO)'"3.9S F(I.48)-oO.24 F(I,5S)=I.9S 
NOI1DII.ity ehi�2)= 0.47 Chi1(2)a 0.54 ehi�2)= 0.47 Chi�2F 0.20 Chi12)= 0.32 Cbi�2)= 1.79 
Hctc:roskeduticity F(I,S7)z>O.6S F(I,57)z>O.02 F(t,69)=O.30 F(I,69)=O.20 F(I,S9)z>O.OO F(I,SS)=O.23 
St.bil ty F(20.26)=3.49 F(20.22)=1.89 F���7)=J.J 1 P(!��)=02 F���)=1.2S F�!;i')=L2S 
eRTS Restriction ehe(l)�26.09 Che(1�5.48 Chi :1�5 .86 Chi ;1�33.15 Chi t�8.82 Chi 1�1l.54 
An obvious explanation for the ulack of success" of our estimations of the standard specification 
is that whilst it may be an appropriate approximation of the aggregate matching process in high turnover 
countries such as the US, its appropriateness within a European context. where sluggish adjustment and 
long term unemployment are more prevalent, is much more debatable. In actual fact, the results of our 
estimations of the specification in which we explicitly allow for a number of factors affecting the overall 
efficiency of the matching technology would appear to have been somewhat "more successful". In that the 
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data would appear to support the existence of a stable aggregate matching function in the British, French 
and Spanish labour markets, well approximated by a Cobb-Douglas function in which both the demand and 
the supply side of the labour market play a significant role in the hiring process. In contrast to earlier studies 
however, we once again fail to find overwhelming evidence of constant returns to scale. If anything the 
function would appear to exhibit slightly increasing returns in both Great Britain and Spain and decreasing 
returns � France. In what follows we confine our discussion of the results to the more general model, given 
that standard hypothesis tests indicate that the specification which explicitly allows for factors affecting the 
efficiency of the matching process is the statistically preferred specification. 
The first thing one notes from table one, is that we obtain a much lower impact on the hiring 
process from the demand side labour market than that found by previous studies'. As is argued by 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) this lower value could be due to the fact that the estimation of the matching 
function using quarterly data subjects the analysis to a considerable amount of information loss, since the 
average duration of a vacancy has been reported to be less than three months. To assess the relevance of 
this argument the French aggregate matching function was re-estimated using monthly data. Yet despite 
estimating the matching relationship at the highest possible frequency, our monthly estimations still report 
significantly lower values than those obtained elsewhere, the results being comparable to OUT quarterly 
estimations. It would appear more likely therefore, that coverage and not information loss due to the 
frequency level of the data used in our estimations, is a significant factor behind our comparatively lower 
coefficient values. Although one should note that these differences could also be due to some extent to 
differences in the dependent variable. It is possible for example, that the use of unemployment to 
employment flows, as opposed to total hires, as the dependent variable will result in vacancies being 
underweighted with respect to unemployment, simply because the dependent variable used in the French 
analysis does not, in contrast to the Blanchard and Diamond analysis, take into account job to job and out of 
the labour force to employment flows. 
This line of reasoning could also go some way to explaining the differences in the variation in 
the unemployment effect across countries. The somewhat higher value found in Spain is likely to be 
reflective of the regulations regarding the registration of co/ocaciones. More specifically, the fact that in 
order for a contrato to be considered a co/ocacioIJ both the vacancy and the person filling the position have 
to have been both previous1y registered at INEJo..f, is likely to result in a larger unemployment impact than 
one might find in labour markets in which such pre-registration is not required. The relatively low 
, In the case of France, a similar magnitude is however reported by Burda and WypJosz in their study of outflows from French 
unemployment. 
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unemployment effect found in Great Britain on the other hand, could be reflective of the fact that non­
unemployed job searchers have over our sample period been more sucCessful in the competition for jobs 
than their unemployed counter-parts. Such an explanation does however, tend to draw into question the 
validity of the assumption implicit in the standard specification that the unemployment stock represents cp1 
appropriate proxy for the pool of available job seekers in the UK . 
. Focusing on the factors argued in the literature to affect the overall efficiency of the matching 
technology, we find that whilst increases in the level of mismatch and unemployment benefits/replacement 
ratios have the expected adverse effect on the long run efficiency of the matching technology, the impact of 
these factors varies quite consi�erably across countries. Increases in the level of regional mismatch result in 
a much lower number of matches for a given level of unemployment and vacancies in Spain than in the 
France or the UK, where the magnitude of these effects is found to be similar to that reported in a number 
of Beveridge curve studies. This "relatively" lower impact could however, be reflective of the fact that the 
degree of mismatch in both France and Great Britain has not changed significantly during the past twenty 
years. If anything, the relevant indices illustrate that the degree of regional and occupational mismatch has 
actually declined over this period. Moreover, the levels of regional mismatch in France would appear to be 
(and have been) much lower than those which prevail in other European countries. In addition, the 
particularly low level of inter-regional migration reported in Spain over our sample period would have 
undoubtedly exacerbated regional imbalances further, thus resulting in a larger mismatch effect 
An attempt was also made to assess the impact of structural change in the labour market on the 
overall efficiency of the matching process, since adjustments to structural shifts in the economy can be 
expected to have a considerable impact on the overall matching process with displaced workers finding 
themselves unable to effectively compete with other job seekers for employment in new and expanding 
sectors. In an attempt to capture these effects, we experimented with a number of structural indicators 
previously used in the modelling of unemployment flows (see for example, Junaker and Price (1984) and 
Nickell (1982». More specifically, we examine the impact of the expansion (contraction) of service 
(industrial) sector employment on matching efficiency, by including in our original specification the 
proportion of total employment in industry and services. The idea being that decreases (increases) in the 
ratio of industrial (services) employment can be expected to have a negative impact on overall matching due 
to the resulting emergence of a skill mismatch. Although these variables were signed in accordance with a 
priori expectations, it is only in the Spanish case that we obtain any significant impact. The results once 
again highlighting the structural component of Spanish unemployment, in that a 1 % reduction in the 
proportion of employment in industry results in the long run in a 1.93% decrease in the number of new 
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hires. It should be noted however, that the magnitude of this coefficient and its associated standard errors, 
implies that it is not very weU determined. 
The results obtained also indicate considerable variation in the unemployment benefit effect (be 
it changes in the replacement ratio or in the average level of benefits paid) on the long run efficiency of the 
matching function. The largest impact occurring in Spain, a country recognised as having, despite recent 
reforms to tighten the eligibility/generosity of the system, a relatively more generous benefit system than 
Britain or Franc:e9 . It is interesting to note also that whilst correctly signed in terms of a priori expectations, 
we fail to obtain any significant long run effect from a number of factors, such as the proportion of the 
unemployed classified as being: long tenn; with less than secondary education; without previous work. 
experience; or household heads. Factors which have been argued in the literature (and have subsequently 
become the focus of labour market policy) to have had a considerable adverse impact on the degree of 
effectiveness/search intensity of the unemployed in Europe. In the French and Spanish estimations we do 
however find some evidence to support the argument that the increases in youth unemployment which have 
occurred in both of these countries may have had a considerable adverse effect on the efficiency of overaJl 
matching. Such an adverse impact may seem somewhat counter·intuitive in that one would expect. and one 
does indeed often find, that increases in the proportion of youths tends to have a positive, albeit small, effect 
on unemployment- outflow estimations (reflecting the fact that this group tends to have a relatively high 
search intensity). It has to be remembered however, that in both France and Spain, (but particularly in the 
latter) this is the group of individuals which has found itself increasingly shut out of the labour market over 
our sample period. 
In contrast to the findings of empirical work seeking to explain the outward shift in the 
Beveridge Curve which has occurred over the past two decades (see for example, Budd, Levine and SoUth 
(1989):h changes in the proportion of long tenn unemployment are not found to have a significant impact on 
matching efficiency. It is important to note however, that it is somewhat difficult to directly assess the 
impact of changes in the proportion of long tenn unemployment on the hiring function, since the perception 
of a reduction in the quality of the unemployed. which may occur in the aftermath of significant increases in 
the numbers of long tenn unemployed, could also result in less vacancies cooUng on to the market (see 
Pissarides (1990». It could however, be that disenfranchisement from the labour force does not, as implied 
by the traditional definition of long tenn unemployment, occur after being unemployed for one year, but at 
higher unemployment durations. In order to test this hypotheses we redefine the long tenn unemployed as 
9 Spanish earnings related benefits typically have a replacement ratiQS 0(70% ( r3uing to 60% after six months), with a 
duration of24 months. 
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those individuals with more than two years unemployment duration and re·estimate our original 
specification for France (the only country for which the relevant data is available throughout the entire 
sample period). Once again however, although the coefficient is correctly signed in tenns of a priori 
expectations, it is insignificant. A significant effect is only obtained when we define long term 
unemployment as being the proportion of males unemployed for more than two yearsiO. In this case not 
only do the French "very" long term unemployed fail to positively participate in the competition for jobs, 
but increases in their numbers as a proportion of the unemployment stock actually make it worse for all 
other unemployed job seekers. In that French employers would appear to equate an increase in the 
proportion of very long term male unemployment with a reduction in the overall quality of the pool of 
available job seekers for a given level of unemployment and vacancies. Matching consequently becomes less 
efficient as problems of sorting and signal extraction emerge, at a macroeconomic level this sequence of 
events would offer one explanation for the shift in the Beveridge'Curve which occurred in France from the 
mid-1970·s. In contrast to the findings ofBlanclwd and Diamood (1989) then, the French unemployed do 
not appear to enter the matclUng function in the homogenous manner implicit in the standard specification. 
Simply assuming that the stock of unemployment is an appropriate proxy for the number of job searchers is 
arguably a misjudgement, which could result in potential problems of mispecification bias for the existing 
European work in this area. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the nature of our dependent variable only the 1986 and 1989 
changes in employment legislation are found to have had a significant impact on the French aggregate 
matching function. The relaxation of the firing constraint in 1986 having a positive effect on the matching 
process and the 1989 tightening of controls over the use of temporary contracts and the regulations for' 
dismissals having the expected adverse impact. In common with the Junakar and Price (1984) study on the 
determinants of unemployment outflows in Great Britain. only the 1975 Unfair Dismissal Act and the 1980 
Employment Acts are found to have any long run effect on the estimated function. These results implying 
that the introduction of more stringent labour market regulations regarding a finn's ability to fire workers, 
which in tum makes employment adjustment more costly, has a negative impact on the matching process. 
Further suppon for the adverse effects of an over-regulated labour market is provided by the Spanish 
analysis, which again illustrates that the loosening of restrictive employment legislation results in the long 
10 This result cou1d be explained by the fact that a large percentage of the long term unemployo:l in Franoe IUe actually 
women, who, although they have no intention of participating in the labour market, are able to sign on in order to gain acc:css 
to benefits. Increases in the numbers of long tenn unemployed may not therefore, necessarily be equated with a de(:line in the 
effectiveness of the unemployment stock as a whole. if these increases simply reflect, as has been the case during the 1980's, a 
larger number of women signing on the register. 
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run, in a significantly higher number of new hires for a given level of unemployment and vacancies. 
Attempts to proxy changes in the restrictiveness of employment legislation by including either the 
proportion of labour disputes found in favour of the employee or the total number of unfair dismissa1s cases 
brought before the relevant tribunals and conciliation boards in our specification were however, 
unsuccessful. In that whilst correctly signed, they were not found to be significant. Somewhat surprisingly 
however, both the 1984 and 1994 legislative changes appear to have had a similar impact on the matching 
process. One would have instead expected the 1984 loosening of employment regulations to have had 
considerable more of an impact on matching efficiency than the 1994 changes to the co/ocaciones 
registration system. which after all primarily affected the timing of registration. There are however, two 
possible explanations for this result. The first being that the 1984 legislation was introduced alongside a 
series of amendments to the unemployment benefit system (discussed in more details in the following 
section), cha.'1ges which one would have expected to have had a negative impact on the matching 
technology via a reduction in the level of search intensity of the unemployed. Similarly, the 1994 
administrative changes to the regulation of co/ocaciones were introduced at the same time as a number of 
important labour market reforms likely to have a positive impact the efficiency of the matching process. 
These refomls involved. a) amendments to the employment protection legislation regarding collective 
dismissals and the. relaxation of jhc ordelulIIzas /aboraJes in order to increase the firm's ability to allocate 
labour efficiency; and b) financial incentives tor a number of specific types of employment contracts, such as 
the new youth employment contract (colltrato de apelldizaje). It is reasonable to assume, that the impact of 
the introduction of these reforms is also being captured by the 1994 dummy. 
A priori it may ;;cern somewhat surprising, especially given the fairly large impact deregulation 
appears to have had on the French and Spanish function, that we fail to find a significant impact on the 
British matching r . .lDction from the relaxation of firing regulations in 1982. There are two likely explanations 
for this somewhat ccunter -intuitive result. The first is one oftiming: the British deregulation took place at a 
time when Great Britain and the rest of Europe were experiencing a period of depressed demand and tight 
monetary policy. It seems reasonable to expect that in such a climate these changes would not necessarily 
have the immediate expected impact on the hiring function. Moreover, the increases in the level of 
uncertainty with respect to the nature of prevailing economic conditions, which occurred at this time, are 
likely to have outweighed/offset any positive impact of changes in legislation on a finn's willingness to hire 
and fire. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it has to be remembered that French and Spanish 
deregulation not only took place during a period of much more favourable demand conditions, but against a 
background of a much tighter regulated labour market. It may not be so surprising then, that these changes 
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were found to have more of an impact than in an economy such as Great Britain which, in European tenns, 
was already more akin to the US system. 
3 Labour Market Policies and the Efficiency ortbe Aggregate Matching Function: 
In this final section we use the aggregate matching function framework to examine whether: a) 
the changes in the unemployment benefit system; and b) the labour market policies adopted by the 
respective Governments over the past fifteen years have, as intended, increased the general efficiency of the 
matching process. This approach would seem particularly suited to an assessment of the effectiveness of 
such policies, given that their objective was, and still is, to increase the effectiveness and thus the 
employability of the unemployed and therefore ultimately to raise the overall efficiency of the matching 
process. 
Manpower training schemes have since the 1970's been repeatedly used by Governments in an 
attempt to curb the growing unemployment problem. One would have expected a number of these 
programmes, in particular those aimed at individuals classified as being 'difficult to employ' - namely the 
young and the long term unemployed, to have had an indirect impact on the hiring process. In that 
participation should in principle have resulted in an increase in the overall effectiveness of the unemployed, 
thereby raising the quality of the pool I I . Changes in the unemployment benefit regime on the other hand, 
can be expected to have important ramifications for the efficiency of the aggregate matching function via 
their impact on the level of search intensity of the unemployed. Although the extent to which changes in the 
level of the minimum wage can be argued to form an integral part of active labour market policy is 
somewhat debatable, we also examine, given the central role it has played in the European unemployment 
debate, the impact of changes in the minimum wage on the efficiency of the aggregate matching process. 
In an attempt to isolate the impact of changes in these policies on the overall efficiency of the 
matching function we include in our previous specification: a) dummy variables to cover the periods in 
specific active labour market programmes operated; and b) in the French and Spanish analysis, the number 
of training contracts registered at the national employment office in the previous quarter as a proxy for the 
proportion of individuals involved in labour market programs. To examine the impact of changes in the 
unemployment benefit system the relevant dummy variables are again included, together with a measure of 
benefit coverage. The idea here being that changes in the overall degree of "generosity" of the employment 
protection system, in terms of leniency of eligibility conditions and length of time benefits are paid, will to 
I I  A more in"epth discussion of the labour market policies for France and Great Britain can be found respectively in 
Comilleau (1989) and Disney et a!. (1992). 
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some extent be captured by changes in the degree of coverage. In the empirical analysis we experiment with 
two types of coverage indicators: the first asses  the impact of changes in the proportion of the 
unemployed receiving insurance related unemployment benefit; the second looks at the coverage issue from 
a wider perspective, to examine the impact of changes in the proportion of the unemployed receiving any 
kind of unemployment benefit related payment, in other words insurance or assistance benefits. 
Tabl.2: 
The Impact of Active Labour Market Policies on the Efficiency of the Matching Process: 
(I-statistics in parenthesis) 
Variables Fnm<:e Great BritaiD Spain 
unemployment 0." (1.89) 0.19 (2.12) 0." (1.18) 
....,.".; .. 0.11 (1.97) 0." (3.03) 0.31 (1.76) 
benefit effect �.31 (-2.71) -0." (-1.52) ·1.00 (.2.2�) 
prop U who are youths 0.53 (2.37) 4.5 (-3.47) 
regional mismatch -0.06 (-3.69) -0.09 (-1.91) �.70 (-1.45) 
structunl change 4.57 (1.77) 
proportion U female 1.30 (2.24) 
proportion U long term -9.18 (-2.13) 
LegtIl.tioD 
France 1986 0.09 (2.75) 
France 19&9 .0. IS (.2.81) 
Spain 1984 0.02 (0. IS) 
Spain 1994 0.31 (1.60) 
Great Britain 1975 .0.38 (·4.00) 
Great Britain 1980 .0.22 (-3.31) 
Minimum Wage �.2S (.(lAS) ·1.32 (-1.92) 
No. of new training contracts 0.06 (1.68) 0.24 (1.25) 
ALMP Great Britain 75·78 0.04 (1.02) 
ALMP Great Britain 82-86 -0.04 (-0.67) 
Change to Benefit system 0.06 (2.00) 0.13 (0.93) 
Diapostks 
R 8M' 0." 0.85 0.46 
LM Correlation F(4,3S)=1.22 F(4.4�)=L5697 F(4.43�.193 
Ramsey Reset Test F(I.38)=1.1044 F(I,48F2.4712 F(l ,42)=1.73 
Normality Cbi2(2P'O.60962 cru2(2)-O.IOO64 Cbi2(2)-2.91 
Hcteroskedasticity F(l,S7)=O.3S403 F(1.69)=(W48939 F(I,58)=O.OS5 
Stability Test F(20,20)-2.16 F(l 7,34r F(2I,24)-1.30 
Number of obseJvations 59 71 60 
The French policy response to the escalating unemployment problem in terms of active labour 
market measures has resulted throughout 1980's in a continual switching of focus from one targeted group 
to another. Such a stance has culminated in a myriad of polices which makes it somewhat difficult to pin­
point the relevant polices to be included in our analysis. The most effective, in terms of attainment of their 
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original objectives and magnitude of coverage, wouJd appear to be: the early retirement progranunes 
introduced in 1985 by the Mitterand government; the job creation schemes introduced during the latter half 
of the 1980's and the early 1990's aimed primarily at youth and the long term unemployed (Contral de 
relour a ['emp/oi (CRE) and Contral emp/oi-soJidarite (CES). In 1992 France also introduced a much 
needed and long overdue overhaul of the unemployment benefit system. The most relevant changes, in 
terms of their possible impact on matching efficiency, being that: a) the level of benefits paid are now 
determined by both the individual's previous salary and his period of contribution to the system; and b) 
unemployment benefits are progressively reduced every four months. 
As is evident from the results in table two, column one, although correctly signed we fail to obtain the 
expected significant adverse effect from the increases in the real value of the French minimum wage (SMIC), 
which occurred during the early 1980's. Whilst this may be somewhat surprising, in that one would expect 
increases in the SMIC to have the same effect as the introduction of more restrictive labour market policies, 
it may be the case that the impact of these changes is, as with the impact of increases in other labour costs, 
reflected in the vacancy data itself The 1992 regime switch to a more "stringent" benefit system would on 
the other hand, appear to have gone some way towards fulfilling its objectives. in that it has bad a poSitive 
long run impact on matching efficiency. The relatively small impact obtained is not however, that surprising, 
given the nature of these changes. For, benefits in France are .still comparatively generous: initial 
replacement ratios remain high and benefit duration is still considerably longer than most other European 
countries. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the inconsistency of French labour market policy, attempts to 
focus on the impact of individual labour market policies proved to be unsuccessful, in that none of the 
dummy variables introduced to isolate the impact of individual programmes were significant. Increases in 
the number of training (stage) and apprenticeship contracts, the main objective of which being to increase 
the effectiveness of those job seekers under 25 years of age, are however, found to have a positive long run 
impact on the overall efficiency of the matching process. 
The active labour market programmes considered most likely to have an impact on the matching 
process in Great Britain during our sample period are: a) the job creation schemes which operated from 
1975 to 1978; and b) the Community Progranune which operated over the period 1982 to 1986 in an 
attempt to increase the general level of effectiveness of the unemployed. and in particular the long term 
unemployedll. From the results of column two, it would appear that the British Government's policies fail 
to have had the expected significant impact on the long run characteristics of the matching function. The 
11 The Community Progr.unmc was one of the largest employment measmes targeted at adults in Great Britain, particular 
focus being the long term unemployed, all of whom were offered plaocments of one year's duration on programme. 
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only programme which appears to have had any long term impact, and even then it is barely significant, is 
the direct job subsidy scheme, which operated in the manufacturing sector. These results in themselves 
cannot however, simply be taken as support for the argument that job subsidies have in the past worked 
better than training schemes, since a more plausible explanation for the apparent lack of impact of training 
polices on the hiring process is provided by the work of Turner (1985), whose research illustrates that 
approximately 65% of those individuaJs who left the Community Programme actually re-entered 
unemployment. What is perhaps more relevant to our insignificant result is the fact that: a) the scheme was 
voluntary. It may have been more effective if registration was compulsory, although given the nature of the 
work undertaken, this is somewhat debatable; and b) the Community Programme cannot really be perceived 
as a way of increasing skills, since most of the people on the scheme worked part-time on jobs, which 
aJthough deemed to be of practical importance to the Community, did not really address the problems we 
associate with long term unemployment, such as worker condition discipline and skiD deterioration. In 
contrast, one Government policy claimed to have been very effective in this respect is the Restart Program 
aimed specifically at improving the efficiency of job search, by providing advice and free facilities for 
applying for positions etc .. Studies of unemployment outflows (see for example, Disney (1992) illustrate 
that this policy appears to have had a tremendous impact on outflow from unemployment for long tenn 
unemployed. One would have expected it therefore, to have had a significant impact on the overall matching 
process. Unfortunately, as with the changes made to the British unemployment benefit system introduced in 
1986, it was not in operation during our sample period. 
Throughout the 1980's Spain has made numerous amendments to the regulations concerning 
training related contracts (Contratos de Formacion), originally introduced at the end of the 1970's, which 
have largely affected eligibility and the duration structure of such contracts. At the outset we attempted to 
isolate the impact of each of these changes by including the appropriate dummy variables for the individuaJ 
changes in legislation. Not surprisingly. given the nature and frequency of these changes, our attempts were 
unsuccessful. In an attempt to side-step these problems, we therefore included in our specification the total 
number of these contracts registered each Quarter at INFM as a proxy for the extent of labour market 
programmes. We also allow for a dummy variable to capture the impact of the comprehensive set of labour 
market reforms to promote employment announced by the government in December 1993. A particularly 
interesting feature of which being the introduction of the Contratos de apendizaje, which in an attempt to 
ease the school-to-work transition considerably reduced the costs to finns of employing those aged between 
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16-24 without post-secondary or higher educationll. Over the past 15 years Spain has also "tinkered" with 
the unemployment benefit system on numerous occasions: in 1984 Ley 3/184 extended coverage of the 
groups eligible for unemployment benefit and increased the average amount of benefits received; in 1989 the 
maximum duration of benefits was increased by 6 months for all those classified as long term unemployed 
and those over the age of 45. In addition, further extensions to coverage occurred, with a reduction in the 
minimum age entitling someone to indefinite unemployment benefit. This trend of increasing generosity was, 
in line with other European countries, reversed somewhat in 1992 (Ley 22//992), with the introduction of 
tighter eligibility conditions and a reduction in both the duration of benefit entitlement and the level of 
replacement ratios. Again we attempt to capture these effects by including a measure of benefit coverage, as 
a proxy for changes in the degree of generosity. together with a dummy variable to account the regime 
switch in 1992. 
Regardless of whether we use coverage or shift dummy "t'2riables, we fail to find a significant 
effect from the minor changes to the benefit system which occurred throughout the 1980's. Furthermore, 
the dummy variable included to account for the move to a more stringent regime at the end of 1992, 
although correctly signed in terms of a priori expectations, is also found to be insignificant. One explanation 
for this lack of significance could be that although the reductions in replacement ratios and the minor 
reforms to benefit duration undoubtedly lowered the financial cost of the system, such changes are not likely 
to have much of an impact on the effectiveness of the unemployed (and in particular on the long term 
unemployed), given that a large part of unemployment in Spain is concentrated on the young and women. 
groups who the data suggests do not have the necessary work experience to be entitled to unemployment 
benefit. 
Active labour market policy in Spain, in tenns of the provision of job related training schemes 
would on the other hand appear to have been somewhat more successful. despite a significant amount of 
criticism as to the quality and focus of training programs. The results obtained indicate that increases in the 
number of training contracts has a positive impact on the number of new hires, for a given level of 
unemployment and vacancies. The effectiveness of this scheme is reflected in the fact that the number of 
contracts registered at /NEMincreased from 110,000 to 260,000 in 1994. The appropriateness of the use of 
the number of training contracts as a measure of the extent/effectiveness of active labour market policy is 
however, open to the criticism that these fonns of contracts cannot really be used as an indicator of the 
effectiveness of active labour market policy, since individuals who do not satisfy the eligibility criteria are 
11 Under sucb contracts enlplo),ers: a) pay a wage of 70, 80 and 90"/0 of the lep.ai minimum wage during the first. second and 
third year of employment; and b) do not pay contributions to the unemployment system during the course of the contract. In 
retwn the law stipulalcs that 15% of the apprenticc's work time is to be spent in theoretical training. 
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more often than not ,employed under such contracts to enable firms to take advantage of the tax or social 
security contributions allowances. It has to be remembered however, that even if the system is abused by 
potential employers and thus incurs a dead·weight loss, its very existence can still indirectly facilitate the 
overall efficiency of matching. 
Finally, it is interesting to note, that in contrast to the French results increases in the real value 
of the Spanish minimum wage are found to have the expected adverse effect on matching efficiency. 
4 Concluding Remarks: 
Two issues emerge from this initial empirical work. Fll'stly, in contrast to existing work. in this 
area. whilst our results support the existence of an aggregate matching function in all three labour markets, 
we do not find overwhelming evidence for what has become the somewhat standard assumption in 
theoretical research of a constant returns to scale matching technology. The matching technology would 
instead appear to exhibit increasing returns in both Great Britain and Spain and decreasing in France. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, given the ramifications for both empirical and theoretical research 
in this area, a number of our results draw into question the appropriateness of the standard specification 
within a European context. For example, the fact that: a) changes in the proportion of very long term 
unemployed have a significant adverse impact on the French matching function; and b) we find a relatively 
small coefficient on British unemployment would tend to draw into question the validity of the assumption 
that the stock of unemployed is an appropriate proxy for the available pool of workers. Further research 
into finding an appropriate specification for the matching function, a function which plays a fundamental 
role in the flows literature., would therefore appear to be warranted. 
One interesting implication of our results is that whilst the evidence presented offers support for 
the adverse effect of factors such as mismatch, unemployment benefit and other structural issues often cited 
in the literature as introducing frictions into the matching process. changes in labour market regulation per 
se do not have the immediate impact on the hiring process that one might have expected. One interpretation 
of this result that deregulation appears to. have had the expected effects in France and Spain, but not in the 
UK could be that it is not only labour market regulation per se, but the nature of the prevailing economic 
conditions under which these changes take place, which is relevant in determining the impact that such 
changes have on the hiring process (see Bell (1996». It is however, important to remember, when 
interpreting these results, that it is difficult to disentangle the effects of employment protection on a finn's 
willingness to hire and its decision whether or not to open a vacancy. 
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In the final section of the paper we extend our analysis somewhat further in order to use the 
matching function framework to assess the impact of a number of active labour nwket policies introduced 
during the past 15 year on the efficiency of the matching process. The results obtained are somewhat mixed. 
Although active labour market policy per se. as reflected in the British results, does not appear to have had 
much of any impact on the efficiency of labour market matching, work related training schemes and 
reductions in the Spanish minimum wage paid to youths do appear to have had a significant positive impact 
on the matching process. What would appear to be important to the success of these schemes, as measured 
by their impact on the matching process., is the very nature of the programmes themselves, in terms of what 
the policy involves, who it is targeting and how it ls prOvided. More specifically, when policies are aimed at 
specific groups know to be at a disadvantage in the job market, they appear to be more effective. In stark 
contrast the general provision regardless of quality, of job training or work experience which has tended to 
characterise the British labour market progranunes of the late 1970's and early 1980's would oot appear to 
have little impact on the overall efficiency of the matching process. 
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Table A.I: 
Sample Summary Statistics 
F� ORa, spain 
Britain 
M<on Std. Dev M"" Std. Dev M"" Std. Dev 
�t:llfl Vlti,blts 
NcwHircs 6.048 0.12424 7.5991 0.2185 6.6672 0.48607 
Unemployment 7.75 0.25382 7.0491 0.67026 7,7401 0.22600 
Vacanties 4.1293 0.26534 s.o927 0.33415 4,3368 0.63359 
Vllriables .fJI�ctlhg Se.rch and MbrPatc:b 
regional miStMlch -3.8433 0.59972 4.3253 0.48902 -3.3199 0.14939 
structurnl change 3.1751 0.06927 
proportion of long term U -2.1185 0,31617 -1.4910 0.34126 
repJacement mtio 1.1083 0.329)4 0.4089 0.02099 0.43982 0.24403 
Minimwn wage 1.6197 0.06663 ..0.57557 0.06040 
proportion ofW1der 25 -1.1431 0.26126 ..(1.81210 0.17267 
pl>pOrtion female .o.669S4 0.04251 
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DATA APPENDIX: 
Principal Variables: 
British new hires: unpublished data on the total number of engagements in the economy, based on P4S 
returns. Manpower Services Commission. 
French new hires: constructed from unemployment outflows disaggregated according to destination 
series published in Bulletin Mensuel des Slalistiques du Travail du Ministere du Travail. More specifically, 
new hires are calculated as the number of individuals leaving the unemployment register to take up 
pennanent employment. 
Spanish new hires: total number of ooiocaciones registered each quarter at the Instituto NacionaJ de 
Emp/eo, Estadislicas de Empleo. Instituto Nacional de Emp/eo. 
British unemployment: unpublished historic series of the stock of registered unemployment, 
Department of Employment. 
French unemployment: monthly registered stock ofunempioyment, Bulletin Mensuel des Statistiques 
du Travail du Ministere du Travail. 
Spanish unemployment: monthly registered stock of unemployment, Estadisticas de Empieo, Instituto 
Nacional de Empleo. 
British vacancies: unfiUed vacancies series registered at the end of the month with local employment 
centres taken from various issues of the Department of Employment Gazette. This series was then adjusted 
to take account of vacancies not registered with employment centres according to the method proposed by 
Jackman, Layard and Pissarides (1989). 
French vacancies: unfilled vacancies registered at the ANPE at the end of each month, Bulletin 
Mensuel des Statistiqlles d" Travail du Ministere du Travail. 
Spanish vacancies: unfilled vacancies registered at INFM at the end of each month. published in 
Estadisticas de Empleo. Instituto Naciollal de Empleo. This series was then adjusted according to the 
methodology of Antolin (1994). 
Mismatch and Search Intensity Variables: 
British benefit effect: replacement ratio calculated on the basis of the unemployment benefit rate for a 
married man. with two children., excluding earnings related supplement, Abstract of Statistics,. Department 
of Health and Social Security. 
The French and Spanish benefit effect is the ratio of average benefits paid to average earnings,. where 
average benefits were calculated as the ratio of monthly unemployment benefits paid per person entitled to 
them. Data on the amount of benefits paid each month. together with the number of people entitled to 
benefits was taken for: France, from Bulletin Menmel des Statistiques du Travail du Ministere du Travail; 
and for Spain., from the Estadisticas de Empleo, Instituto Nacional de Empleo. The French data on average 
earnings was obtained from [NSEE, the Spanish from various issues of the Bolelm Esladislico del Banco de 
Espaila. 
The minimum wage series for France is taken from the Bulletin Mensuel des Statistiques du Travail 
du Ministere du Travail. The Spanish series is taken from various issues of the Boletin Esladlslico del 
Banco de EsPQlla. 
Regional mismatch index, follOwing Jackman and Roper ( 1986) is defined as being equal to 
1/2 �(Yv . u Iv) . where the SUbscript i denotes the regional unemployment and vacancy rates. The regional 
unemployment and vacancies data were obtained from the sources quoted in the previous sub-section for 
the aggregate variables, and where applicable adjusted on the same basis outlined in the text. 
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Structural change index defined as XLI4(N�)1, where Ni denotes employment in sector i. More 
specifically, sector t, represents agriculture, industry, construction and services and N, total aggregate 
employment. Data on employment in agricultural, construction, industry and services in: Great Britain is 
taken from the Department of Employment Gazette; Spain from the Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de 10 
Poblacion Activa, JNE); and France from the OECD Quarterly Labour Force Statistics. 
The number of training contracts for France is defined as the total number of apprenticeship and stage 
contracts (the only training related contracts for which a historical period was available over the whole of 
our sample) registered at the ANPE each month. Both of these series are published in the Bulletin Mensuel 
des Statistiques dll Travail. Due to the unavailability of more disaggregated data throughout the whole of 
the sample period, the Spanish series refers to the total number of training related contracts (contratos de 
jormacion) registered at JNEM each month. This series is published in the &tadisticas de Empleo, Jnstituto 
Nacional de Empleo. 
Unemployment data disaggregated according to: age; duration; and previous labour force experience 
are: for Great Britain taken from various issues of the Department of Employment Gazette; for France, from 
the Bulletin Mensuel des Statistiques du Travail du Ministere du Travail; and for Spain from the Encuesta 
de 10 Poblacion Activa, INE. 
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